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Abstract 
This paper reviews the experience of anti-corruption commissions in the region and argues 
that the debate on the establishment of a national anti-corruption body in Australia is 
dependent on the country’s political culture, institutions and elites. Corruption and integrity 
coexist and are conceived as the obverse and converse respectively, of a functional and 
dysfunctional system. Anti-corruption bodies in the Asia-Pacific region are compared against 
applicable global anti-corruption frameworks, policies and principles. The paper proposes a 
conceptual model for a National Integrity Ecosystem (NIE), premised on community values 
and trust and situates the Australian experience within such an ecosystem. A federal anti-
corruption watchdog is the missing piece in Australia’s institutional infrastructure. Its 
acceptance and effectiveness requires difficult and sustained change in the underlying 
political culture of the country and its elites.  
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1 Introduction 
Cui bono? Or who benefits? Anti-corruption watchdogs around the Asia-Pacific have been 
established after long drawn-out fights to establish public confidence and trust in their 
country’s institutions, often against the entrenched, vested interests of powerful elites.  
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The protracted debate and associated struggle to establish a federal anti-corruption watchdog 
in Australia echoes the experience of its neighbours and Asia-Pacific counterparts. Those 
with economic and political power have always been reluctant to share it. But the history of 
economic growth and development attests to the value of open institutions that provide equal 
opportunity and access for all, not just for existing vested interests (Acemoglu & Robinson 
2012).  
 
This paper highlights the importance of building strong institutions backed by the force of 
political culture and legal systems which ensure that anti-corruption watchdogs have 
legitimacy in the eyes of community. A framework is proposed to define the context and 
boundaries of a national integrity ecosystem (NIE). A desk, literature survey of anti-
corruption commissions around the region and Australia was undertaken as a basis for 
summarising the state of play and experience of anti-corruption watchdogs in the Asia-Pacific 
region.  
 
2 Literature Review: Institutional theory and anti-corruption institutions 
As a form of human organising, institutions are the outcome of social and economic actions 
(Smelser and Swedberg 2005). Adam Smith, in his 1776 treatise, the Wealth of Nations, 
pointed out the importance of confidence in a state whereby there is a ‘regular administration 
of justice’, security in property, law and the enforcement of contracts. This is known 
generally as ‘the rule of law’. 
Across countries, political institutions reflect differing cultures of socio-economic, historical, 
judicial, political and religious relationships. These humanly devised constraints on the 
structure of human interactions and their respective enforcement mechanisms may be both 
formal and/or informal in character (North 1990). Informal constraints include norms of 
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behaviour, convention and codes of conduct, and enforcement mechanisms, and are part of 
‘the heritage we call culture’. Formal constraints are the creation of the polity covering rules, 
laws, and constitutions: Institutions are the rules of the game. Indeed, institutions reflect 
society’s concerns and in some cases, its need to adapt as they ‘provide the incentive 
structure of an economy; as the structure evolves, it shapes the directions of economic change 
towards growth, stagnation or decline.’ (North 1991: 1) 
Institutional theory posits their continued existence and reason for being as social constructs 
that shape ‘the means by which interests are determined and pursued’ (Scott 1987: 508), or, 
decide who gets what, and when. Once established, institutions are ‘products of interaction 
and adaptation; they become receptacles of group idealism; they are less readily expendable.’ 
(Selznick 1957: 22) 
There are three forces underlying an institution’s establishment and continued existence: 
functional, political and social (Dacin et al 2002). Functional pressures seek to improve 
organizational performance; political pressures seek to redistribute power through institutions 
and are particularly in play when there is a change in political leadership; and finally, social 
pressures arise from the public’s expressed needs for change consistent with the community’s 
underlying values. As discussed in this paper, political and social pressures are the primary 
drivers in the calls for and establishment of independent anti-corruption commissions. 
In its 2002 World Development Report, the World Bank Group emphasized that building 
institutions in government includes putting in place institutions that deal with corruption and 
taxation, alongside building institutions in civil society that advocate for freedom, 
transparency and anti-corruption (World Bank 2001).  
Institution building is a good start, but they must also have appropriate mandates, be robust, 
well-resourced and independent so that they can effectively address issues of corruption and 
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governance (Nye 1967; dela Rama 2017). The role of statutory and regulatory institutions is 
fundamental in order to prevent and address the opportunities for corruption. They can and 
should minimize the risks of politicization exercised in favour of vested interests, and elites 
within existing power structures and the status quo, whilst giving hope to those, from civil 
society especially, who demand accessibility, transparency, accountability and change to 
corrupt practices. In the case of the latter, the proliferation of social media has resulted in the 
wider public awareness of unsavoury practices (Widojoko 2017). 
As dela Rama & Rowley pointed out: 
Institutional development to tackle corruption requires political will, a relatively 
depoliticized bureaucracy and a culture that is willing to be responsive and adapt to 
the changing needs of the country. (2017: 373) 
Weak and ineffective institutions result in the populace being affected by corruption – 
particularly minor or petty forms – in daily life (Proctor 2017). Where government agencies 
and officials are perceived to be corrupt, inefficient and under the sway of or captured by 
vested interests with privileged access, public trust in government and politics is eroded. This 
also contributes to the growth of the ‘black or shadow economy’ that seeks to operate outside 
‘the rule of law’ (Schneider 2011) and, in some cases, to outward immigration (Chin 1999) 
and human trafficking (Guth 2010). Indeed, corruption in public institutions can also affect 
the very physical health of a country’s citizens with the proliferation of infectious disease and 
antimicrobial resistance found to be related to the strength or weakness of a country’s public 
institutions (Collignon et al 2018). The ‘cancer of corruption’ is not only metaphorical but 
also literal. This political disease is seen as the biggest barrier in improving public health in 
developing countries (Mackey 2016 et al). On a more philosophical and speculative 
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interpretation, the proliferation of corruption may be symptomatic of a general disintegration 
and decline of a country’s political system (Allan 2014). 
In practice, the benefits and importance of good institutions and institutional strength are 
highlighted by the example of the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(discussed later in this paper); its mandate empowers it to ‘impartially and rigorously enforce 
the law at all times making corruption a high risk crime in Hong Kong. The corrupt will be 
pursued relentlessly irrespective of their background, status and position.’ (Hong Kong ICAC 
2017) Strong anti-corruption institutions enhance the triumvirate ‘pillars’ of government, 
economy and society, and contribute to the further strengthening of the integrity of the 
ecosystem as a whole. Strengthening these institutions, especially nascent ones, is pivotal in 
countries with a predatory government and/or ‘crony capitalism’ (Hutchcroft 1998). The next 
section proposes a framework outlining a political integrity ecosystem that places corruption 
within the systemic interaction of institutions, culture, values and trust. 
2.1 A National Integrity Ecosystem (NIE) Framework 
This paper argues that understanding political corruption and redressing it effectively- to 
ensure political integrity - must be done within the broad framework of a complex socio-
economic system. As such, in this conceptual paper, we propose the following research 
question: 
What should a national integrity ecosystem (NIE) framework consider? 
Systemic political corruption arises from an ethically degraded political culture (Rogow & 
Laswell 1970); in the case of contemporary western democracies the now problematic values 
and beliefs underlying the neo-liberal market driven agenda of the 1980s have been exposed 
by untenable inequality and the collapse of political trust (Dine 2017; Allan 2014).  
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Culture is given expression through, and interacts with, political institutions; changes in both 
variables are required to secure political integrity and a sustainable democracy. National 
culture reflects the intangible constituents that manifest themselves in the country’s 
institutions. Hofstede’s (1984) four dimensions of national culture find expression to varying 
degrees at an institutional level and within organizations. For example, countries in Asia that 
have a high power distance culture are characterized by organizations with greater 
centralization and enforced hierarchy: the superior-subordinate (such as a manager-employee 
or owner-manager) relationship is marked by strong dependency needs, autocracy or 
paternalism and acknowledgement of authority (1984: 107, 259) as opposed to undermining 
or even subjugation of authority in low-power distance cultures. 
The collectivism/individualism dimension is also important in understanding the culture 
within the framework. Strong individualistic countries such as Australia emphasize the 
responsibility of the individual in their performance of duties as opposed to collectivist 
cultured countries such as South Korea whereby organizations emphasize the responsibility 
of group membership and group decision-making (1984: 171). Even countries that value 
conflict avoidance and social harmony (dela Rama 2011) can manifest a destructive culture if 
senior leaders engage or are perceived to engage in corrupt behaviour, leading to dysfunction. 
Conversely, if senior leaders emphasize transparent, accountable and trustworthy actions – 
walking the talk so to speak - then the acceptable scope for bribery and other malfeasance is 
narrowed (Lee 2000: 647-648).  
In answering our research question, we term our conceptual framework: the ‘National 
Integrity Ecosystem’ (NIE). As presented in Chart 1 this ecosystem has four principal and 
interacting components: national integrity; national corruption; political culture, and, 
institutions. They interact within a broad sphere of values and beliefs, domestic and 
international. Together they constitute a complex and adaptive ecosystem that bears on the 
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level of political trust essential to the functioning of a democratic society. The chart below 
sets the broad conceptual framework for our paper. 
[Insert Chart 1 here] 
The main stakeholders in a NIE are the politicians and the community. In representative 
democracies, the politicians are elected by the community and thereby represent the power 
vested in the people and delegated to the politicians. These stakeholders interface and interact 
through the political system of a country where national culture, trust and values are reflected 
or become embedded in the country’s institutions. 
Domestic and international events are part of, and have an influence on, the integrity 
ecosystem whether through formal or informal channels. Formal channels may include 
institutions, international forums and agreements; while informal channels may be through 
elite/oligarchical networks in business and politics or civil society activism and social media, 
for example as represented by broad developments such as globalisation, neo-liberalism and 
more recently, populism. 
This framework suggests that any individual initiative on integrity and corruption, unless it is 
understood and developed as a component of a much larger ecosystem, is likely to be 
ineffective; each component interacts with the others, often in unforeseen and unpredictable 
ways. At the heart of the integrity ecosystem is the process of 'politics'. Its role is to mediate 
democratically (in the public good) between political institutions/community (right circle) 
and political culture/politicians (left circle) so as to maintain a sustainable balance between 
community values and trust (small eggs) in politicians. This broad setting includes in the big, 
enclosing egg shape (with the inset labels in Chart 2 reflecting the broader ecosystem viewed 
from an Australian perspective) a wide range of international and domestic drivers and trends 
shaping national systems. 
 8 
2.2 Political integrity and corruption 
It is helpful to consider integrity and corruption as ‘two sides of the same coin’ or as the 
‘reverse faces of Janus’, interacting and in tension with each other along a spectrum. This 
allows our driving concern about growing ‘political corruption’ and its implications for 
declining trust in politics to be regarded as a deviation from a desired norm namely, political 
integrity. It provides a conceptual benchmark against which we can measure the extent of 
corruption at any given time or place by the gap between the values and practices of integrity 
and corruption.  
In the first instance, integrity may be thought of as politicians complying to obligations set 
down in official codes of conduct and ethics, and more generally, as their adhering to the 
public-service ethos underpinning these usually non-statutory codes. But relying on the 
personal and even collective integrity of public officers is not a complete answer. Important 
as these ‘positional duties’ certainly are, the concept of political integrity arguably invokes a 
broader ‘commitment to principled causes’ (Hall 2018). Integrity requires the furthering of 
these deeper political commitments while avoiding malfeasance or misconduct. Such 
assessments of political integrity typically require to be made over a long train or series of 
political actions over time rather than a focus on one-off actions.  
Integrity is seen as an increasingly rare commodity, especially in politics, and in an 
environment of systemic non-integrity, politicians who aspire to live to high standards of 
accountability often do not last. Where private and public sectors become closely intertwined, 
a political career is invariably an uncertain and less rewarding undertaking without the right 
links to the business world, providing fertile soil for privileged access to government 
decision-makers, for career development on leaving public office, and even for ‘black letter’ 
bribery and corruption, In such environments, with outsourcing and privatization of large 
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public investments and often discretionary regulatory powers, corruption can also reduce 
economic growth (Tanzi 1998).  
The concept of ‘political corruption’, broadly defined as satisfying private interests at the 
expense of the public interest, raises fundamental questions about underlying value 
judgments of the distinction between private and public arenas and their objectivity. There is 
a tendency to adopt a ‘Western perspective’ or conceptual relativism in judging political 
corruption that maintains an illusion of the purity between public and private domains 
(Bratsis 2014). This norm has evidently varied over history, societies and geography, and in 
particular, has seen a significant shift since the 1980s. From Margaret Thatcher’s ‘there is no 
such thing as society’, and Ronald Reagan’s ‘government is the problem not the solution’, the 
heralding of the neoliberal age (Dine 2017) has seen a general shift in politics away from the 
‘middle ground’ towards the ‘right’. Wide political acceptance of the market-based, profit-
driven, deregulated, small-government cultural ethos has marked a shift in ‘political 
corruption’. In particular, this has been reflected in a public perception that politicians have 
become self-interested and captive of vested interests thereby opening up a wide gap in 
institutional and political trust.  In particular, anti-corruption institutions are now perceived as 
lagging behind this citizen perspective. 
2.3 Political trust 
Popular trust is the belief that the political system will deliver preferred outcomes even if left 
unattended (Shi 2001). The origins of political trust have been sought in theories of both 
cultures and institutions (Mishler & Rose 2001); the former emphasize the endogenous, or 
internalized set of determinants of trust while the latter emphasize the exogenous, or imposed 
set of determinants. Ma and Yang (2014) argue that political trust stems from social trust. It is 
independent in the short run of outputs and performance and is an important determinant of 
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the stability of the system. However, it is dependent ‘on the performance of government and 
institutional arrangements’ especially in authoritarian regimes in East Asia to reform 
institutions, promote governance and control corruption (2014: 339). That is, if trust is lost 
then the political system becomes less stable.  
Indicators of instability may include rampant corruption, scandals, growing role of 
independents in democracies, minority governments, shifting coalitions, changing 
leaderships, frequent elections, and other elements with a growing appeal to populism, 
authoritarianism and nationalism in an attempt to restore stability. Political trust is important 
too in that it provides governments with room to move, to be flexible and adaptive to 
changing circumstances and needs.  
2.4 Political culture and values 
Political culture is the set of underlying collective assumptions, attitudes, sentiments, beliefs 
and values that give structure and order to a political system and its processes, and that 
determine political rhetoric and behaviour (Smith 2001). It is an accepted if disputed 
empirical concept that is transmitted and generally remains unchanged over the short term.  
The term ‘political culture’ first appeared in modern political science in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s to denote the pattern and orientation of political actions within a political system 
(Almond 1956, 1963) and is associated with the modernization theory of democracy (Parsons 
1971). The concept refers to the psycho-sociological limits or conditions within which 
political agents and their belief structure of a given polity operate and, outside of which 
structure political action would be incoherent (Bove 2002).  
In its contemporary revival it has been described as a ‘political rubric’ in light of its 
continued weakness as a concept and theory namely, difficulty in disentangling sub-cultures 
 11 
such as political elites; and difficulty in its interactions with institutions and policy attributes 
to demonstrate a propensity for certain types of political outcomes (Reisinger et al. 1995). 
Differing cultural values and beliefs held by politicians mean that their actions are 
determined by their mediating the different values or meanings that they place on those 
actions rather than by a direct response to the issues in hand. They react to the same stimuli in 
different ways according to their values. Political culture has a significant impact on political 
trust and it cannot be reduced to the effects of institutions and structures. In other words, 
political culture runs deep and cannot be legislated or created to increase political trust. Their 
underlying values and beliefs mediate and create a lag in the change of political culture.   
On the theoretical side, values and beliefs are often treated differently (Alesina & Giuliano 
2015). Beliefs about the consequences of actions can be manipulated by transmission or by 
experiment; values are seen as a more enduring primitive phenomenon. As in psychology, 
culture emphasizes the role of emotions in motivating human behaviour. The rise of political 
‘culture wars’ in Australia illustrates the nature and often divisive impact of such values-
driven politics. These two interpretations of culture, as values or beliefs, are not mutually 
exclusive; they can interact systematically with each other as well as with institutions to 
change over time (Benabou 2008).   
In the case of Australia, these influences include ideology, federalism, liberal democratic 
principles, Westminster tradition and party government (Singleton et al. 2014) and five 
particular dimensions of political culture have been identified: attitudes to reliance on 
government; responsiveness of government; citizen duty; authoritarianism; and, federalism 
(Bean 1993).   
The ethical challenge for developing effective anti-corruption measures turns on identifying 
and establishing improper motives, intentions, interests and benefits between actors involved 
 12 
in corruption, as well as providing evidence of damage to public interest. This is compounded 
at times when the political culture has been shifting as it has in recent decades. The process of 
corrupt behaviour can become subjective and difficult to prove in court; when not proven 
objectively, such actions can only be understood and treated as undermining trust, unethical, 
inefficient or even ineffective but not technically or legally as corrupt.   
2.5 Politics and institutions 
There is strong support for institutional explanations of political trust particularly at the 
micro, individual level, rather than at the macro, societal level (Mishler & Rose 2001). Under 
this view there is grounds for cautious optimism about the potential for nurturing popular 
trust by the establishment of new institutions that promote democratic principles and political 
culture.  
The formal, institutionalized approach to tackling corruption avoids subjective approaches 
that require motives and intentions to be identified. They focus on the criterion of ‘legitimate’ 
actions that comply with due democratic legislative process that includes generality, 
autonomy and publicity (Thompson 1993).  Corruption or inappropriate actions are defined 
as detrimental to the democratic process as a result of specific relations between the actors 
involved. Accordingly, political or private gains are not corrupt in themselves; they are only 
deemed corrupt if obtained by avoiding democratic process controls.   
The narrower idea that the ethics of a situation are based on the specifics of an actual case is 
known as ‘casuistry’ and is often dismissed on the grounds that culture, stories and ethics 
cannot be reduced to generalizing equations (Lanchester 2018). It is a method of applied 
ethics and jurisprudence originally applied to quibbling or evasive ways of dealing with 
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difficult cases of duty. It is often characterized as a critique of principle – or rule-based 
reasoning.4 
Nevertheless, there is increasing pressure for political transparency and accountability to be 
institutionalized, with rules on full disclosure, freedom of information, public declaration of 
assets, and an open invitation to public scrutiny, with rules and regulations governing 
conflicts of interest and requiring full disclosures of personal assets and liabilities by holders 
of public office (World Bank 2001, 2017). Anti-corruption laws must be enforced through an 
independent judicial system based on the rule of law, but proper implementation and 
enforcement face challenges due to the scarcity of politicians with integrity and strong 
political will. Even rigorous laws can become ineffective. Equally important is a democratic 
culture based on rule of law that permits open public scrutiny and effective political 
opposition. A higher level of social capital also means that citizens are more likely to hold 
politicians accountable (Nannicini 2013 et al). They are more likely to punish politicians that 
pursue vested interests and appropriate economic rents for specific groups.  
2.6 Culture and institutions 
Culture and institutions interact and evolve in complex, non-linear, complementary ways, 
with mutual feedback effects and often unstable and unpredictable outcomes. As Hofstede 
(1984) indicated, they are endogenous variables largely determined by longer-term shifts in 
underlying drivers such as geography, technology, wars and other historical shocks. Both can 
determine economic choices and outcomes and it would be wrong to claim the causal 
superiority of either (Alesina & Giuliano 2015).  Thus, the same institutions (political and 
legal; regulatory; welfare state) may function differently in different cultures (trust; family 
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effaces the essential differences between right and wrong’ (from Oxford English Dictionary online).   
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ties; individualism; generalized morality; work-luck), but culture may evolve in differing 
ways depending upon types of institutions.  
It is helpful in considering cultural and institutional change to distinguish between economic 
and political institutions (Acemoglu et al 2005). While political institutions distribute power 
across socio-economic groups this in turn determines the structure of economic institutions. 
Institutions denote which political pressure or interest group on a given issue has the power to 
control social choice. Thus, institutional change is the outcome of voluntary concessions by 
the controlling group under threat of fracturing the ‘social contract’. An example of a 
controlling group is an ‘elite network’. 
2.7 Elite networks 
Elite networks exist in every country (Moore 1979; Moore et al 1980). They may be overt or 
covert in their exercise of power.  In countries where there is high power distance, their 
presence is more noticeable. To understand corruption in the Asia-Pacific region, addressing 
the underlying political culture requires understanding the elites of the region. Indeed, the 
economic forces in the region are driven by elites shaping the political culture and hampered 
by limits of civil society when the latter is allowed to exist and express. 
In the region, elite networks are nominally found in politics, the private sector, the 
bureaucracy and in some cases, more overtly in the military sphere (dela Rama and Rowley 
2017). There can be cross-overs such as when the military elites participate in the private 
sector. The prime example of this is China where its unitary political system has allowed the 
ease of transfer of princelings from military to politics and to business (Bickford 1994). Other 
countries where similar examples exist or have existed include East Timor, Myanmar, South 
Korea, Thailand and Vietnam (Andrews & Htun 2017, McCargo 1998, Phuong 2017, 
Scambary 2017, Yoo & Lee 2009). The power and privilege of access has allowed the 
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politically-connected elites to reify their dominance and is reflected in the primacy of family-
owned business groups in the region (Claessens et al 2000). 
To answer our research question we conducted two desk surveys. First, to identify the 
relevant multilateral agreements, principles and working groups in place to address 
corruption and promote anti-corruption efforts in the region. Second, to compare and contrast 
the experiences of anti-corruption commissions around the region.  
3 Survey one: Anti-corruption frameworks applicable in the region 
The first survey looks at anti-corruption frameworks with a specific focus on the private 
sector role in corruption, both within the private sector and between the private and public 
sectors.  
The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (2005) is the ‘only legally binding 
universal anti-corruption instrument’ signed by 140 countries at the time of writing. In 
addition to bribery and corruption, the Convention’s articles specifically also define trading 
in influence (Article 18), abuse of functions (Article 19) and other acts of private sector 
corruption such as laundering the proceeds of crime (Article 23).  
The UN Global Compact (UNGC) (2004) is a voluntary initiative undertaken by the private 
sector to support universal sustainability principles and sustainable development goals of the 
UN. In particular, the 10th Principle of the Compact directly addresses corrupt actions by 
private sector participants: ‘Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery.’  
Private sector signatories to the Compact are expected to commit to this principle by actively 
avoiding and preventing corruption, and working with stakeholders. (UN Global Compact 
2000)  
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The OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention on Combating Bribery of Public Foreign Officials in 
International Business Transactions (2009) legally binds OECD member-states in 
criminalising the ‘bribery of foreign officials [and is] an anti-corruption instrument focused 
on the supply side of the bribery transaction.’ Article 10 of the Convention sets out the 
conditions for extradition for those to have bribed foreign officials. 
The OECD is also a partner with the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group (G20-ACWG) 
(2010), which covers the 20 most economically advanced countries. The ACWG monitors the 
commitments made in the ratification of UNCAC as it recognises the ‘significant negative 
impact of corruption, economic growth, trade and development. The G20 ACWG in 2015-16, 
looked at the problems of opacity in business ownership such as ‘beneficial ownership 
transparency. 
In 2008, the South East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA-PAC) was established to help 
ASEAN members (with the exception of Myanmar) ‘to strengthen collaborative efforts 
against corruption [and] increase capacity and institutional building among the parties in 
preventing and combating corruption.’ 
Finally, the APEC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Working Group (2011) was established 
to institutionalize member-countries’ work in order to address corruption’s ‘serious threat to 
sustainable economic growth, good governance, market integrity, and enhanced trade and 
investment.’ 
The frameworks mentioned above show the need for mutual cooperation and exchange of 
information when it comes to addressing corruption across countries and in the region. These 
frameworks do not sit in isolation. Civil society participation, such as Transparency 
International’s (2017) work in the region helps inform the continued fight against corruption; 
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while on the private sector side, the International Corporate Governance Network’s (ICGN) 
guidance on anti-corruption practices (2015) helps its investor members avoid such practices. 
Countries in the Asia-Pacific region are nominally signatories to these agreements and some 
are members of the aforementioned working groups with the work undertaken in these 
forums influencing the policy resolutions of their respective anti-corruption commissions.  
These international anti-corruption instruments identify a broad range of interpretations of 
‘corruption’ including ‘grey areas’ such as ‘trading in influence’, ‘good governance’ and 
‘market integrity’ with a clear role articulated on the supply side of ‘political corruption’, 
namely the role of the private sector. 
The next section looks at a select group of anti-corruption commissions around the region and 
how the individual experiences have been shaped by the specific demands and subjected to 
the issues of their national interests, culture and values.   
4 Survey two: Anti Corruption Commissions around the Asia-Pacific region 
This second survey shows the comparative findings and responsibilities of six anti-corruption 
bodies in five Asia-Pacific countries. These bodies are a product of their local conditions and 
culture and they continue to be shaped by balancing their varying experiences of corruption 
and dishonourable conduct against their individual values of integrity. The following table 
lists the name of the different bodies, their remit and private sector oversight. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
4.1 China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) 
In a one-party state, China, the CCDI, is the sole organ to investigation malfeasance of 
Communist Party members and corruption in general. After high profile cases of corruption 
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of party members, who have fallen out of favour such as Bo Xilai, a Minister of Commerce 
and the former party chief in Chongqing (Anderlini 2012, Guo 2014), President Xi Jinping 
led a high profile anti-corruption campaign with international reach, including princelings 
residing in Australia (Garnaut 2012). However, Guo pointed out these efforts by the CCDI 
can be ‘highly politicized owing to concerns about upsetting the existing balance of the 
power structure [and the Party] is reluctant to move towards a depoliticized legal system for 
its high-ranking leaders’ (2014: 621) which means the lack of an independent legal system 
(Winckler and Doyon 2017) will continue to be the Achilles heel in the institutional 
development of the country and its fight against corruption. 
Furthermore, the remit of this body includes investigating Communist party members 
internationally but it has been somewhat hampered with the lack of extradition treaties in 
several countries. There are also suspicions of politicized motives (Garnaut 2012) such as 
when Communist party members are seen to exercise undue political influence in their host 
countries where they have commercial and residential interests. 
4.2 Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) 
The widely influential Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was 
established in 1974, long before the former British colony’s handover to China. Out of all the 
anti-corruption bodies in this section, the HK ICAC has the most formalised investigation 
unit to address private sector corruption, reflecting the status of the island as a global 
financial centre in the region. It has also influenced the establishment of anti-corruption 
bodies in Australia. Below is an abridged version of its organizational chart showing how 
broad its Operations Department is and how it investigates corruption and the different 
divisions examining private sector malfeasance in its many forms, opportunities and 
motivations: 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
ICAC also has a corruption prevention department with an advisory service assigned to the 
main industries present in Hong Kong: building management, financial industries, tourism 
and trading and logistics (Hong Kong ICAC 2018a). ICAC also addresses private-to-private 
sector corruption (Argandoña 2003) with a Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) which 
is explicit on principal-agent (Eisenhardt 1989) conflicts and issues (Hong Kong ICAC 
2018b). 
It continues to be in the best interest of the island that it operates a highly transparent system, 
quid pro quo, penalises the rotten few and supports a private sector so the latter has 
confidence in the functions of her public institutions - both sectors, in turn, securing the 
island’s future and financial sustainability. 
4.3 Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission 
In the wake of its long Suharto dictatorship, Indonesia’s civil society embraced the freedom 
and promise of democracy – warts and all: 
Eradicating corruption, collusion and nepotism was a demand the student protestors 
made in the uprising against President Suharto in 1998, in the midst of the Asian 
financial crisis. (Widojoko 2017: 254) 
Established in 2002, the country’s Corruption Eradication Commission or Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) pursued corrupt targets in the police, judiciary and 
government and has been ‘remarkably effective in identifying corrupt patterns in Indonesia’s 
political officials and bringing even high-ranking officials to justice.’ (Mietzner and Misol 
2012: 118)  
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However, this success ensured that in the process, the KPK also acquired very powerful 
enemies. Indeed, at one point the KPK faced dissolution and its future became uncertain until 
Indonesia’s civil society, through the use of social media, demonstrated their overwhelming 
support for the KPK (Widojoko 2017). While its future is secure at the time of writing, there 
is the possibility that Indonesia’s oligarchical elite will turn on the very body that seeks to 
reduce its power while use of social networks have also brought its own discord (see Lim 
2017).  
4.4 Malaysia’s Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) 
Malaysia’s Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) had several iterations since 1967 before its 
present form was codified in 2009 under the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 
2009. Its role is to ‘eradicate corruption, abuse of power and malpractice.’(MACC 2016) 
MACC is active on social media with a Twitter page @SPRMMalaysia and a mobile app to 
report corruption (MACC 2018).  
In the last 30 years, there has been a plethora of Malaysian initiatives that have sought to 
tackle corruption but their effectiveness remained weak in the face of political corruption and 
a bureaucracy that reflects existing racial/ethnic policies. In Malaysia as in other countries, 
anti-corruption institutions cannot function as they stand, in the absence of political will and 
good governance and leadership (Siddiquee 2010: 169) 
An example of this occurred in July 2018 when the former Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib 
Razak, was arrested for corruption offences (McKenzie 2018). Razak, his family and his 
associates engaged in money laundering involving the country’s sovereign wealth fund 
(1Malaysia Development Berhad or 1MDB) amounting to over US billion dollars which 
caught the eye of the US Department of Justice’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative 
(2016, 2017) and the Australian Federal Police (Begley 2018). Razak’s activities were the 
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subject of a Wall Street Journal (Wright and Clark 2015) and an Australian Four Corners 
investigation (Besser 2016) showing the international reach of the former Prime Minister’s 
ill-gotten gains. Arguably, the catalyst to his downfall was the personal donation of 
USD681M made by a member of the Saudi Royal Family into Razak’s account (Holmes 
2016). 
The fallout from this scandal was the rejection by Malaysians of Razak’s party in the 2018 
elections and the re-election of former president Mahathir Mohammad who campaigned 
heavily on an anti-corruption platform. Under his tenure, Razak had previously tried to 
stymie any probe into his dealings by replacing the country’s Attorney-General and shutting 
down a 2015 MACC investigation (Latiff 2018).  
However, it remains to be seen whether there will be consistent intestinal fortitude to pursue 
acts of malfeasance that will finally break the culture of political corruption in the country. 
When a country’s leaders engage in corruption, they have tacitly approved a culture of 
corruption to embed in its institutions. 
4.5 South Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission 
South Korean’s economic development from the miracle decades of the 1960s to 1980s saw a 
political-business nexus of crony capitalism that allowed the collusion of an ‘uninterrupted 
inflow of extorted subordinates of the government from chaebol owners.’ (Oh 2017: 243). As 
argued by Oh (2017), South Korean corruption has changed from state-led to chaebol-led. 
Chaebols, the business group conglomerates that rule the Korean private sector, are 
increasingly seen as a liability to further political democratisation in the country preventing 
the transformation of the country from a chaebol republic to a market democracy 
(Kalinowski 2016).  
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The country’s first anti-corruption commission was established in 2001. It was reorganised in 
2005 and in 2008, in its current form, South Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights 
Commission (ACRC) was the result of the amalgamation of three existing public bodies in 
2008: the Ombudsman of Korea, the Korean Independent Commission Against Corruption 
and the Administrative Appeals Commission (South Korea ACRC 2016a). The table below 
sets out the country’s anti-corrupt institutional evolution: 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Lee and Jung (2010) noted that the merger has resulted in a weaker institutional body. The 
ACRC’s role and functions are heavily organised around public sector and civil complaints 
against different government bodies. They also include whistleblower protection and 
reporting of public subsidy fraud (South Korea ACRC 2016b). The supervision it has over 
private sector corruption is limited to how public officials interact with their private sector 
counterparts such as the enforcement of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act (South Korea 
ACRC 2016c). In 2012, an ACRC survey reported at least 1% of citizens had paid bribes to 
public officials or entertained them in bars or other activities as a matter of respect or 
courtesy and to prompt business transactions (Kalinowski 2016). 
It is beyond the oversight of the ACRC to investigate wider, grander corruption by chaebols 
as it does not have responsibility to cover elections when instances of political corruption 
through private sector donations occur.  
4.6 Thailand’s National Anti-Corruption Commission 
Thailand’s National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) was formally established in 2008 
from previous iterations (Thailand NACC 2014a). The country’s body of legislation 
addressing corrupt practices is extensive with 17 pieces of regulatory instruments (SEA-PAC 
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2014). Its main mandate is to investigate public officials through an assets test especially if 
they have ‘become unusually wealthy [emphasis added] or committed an offence of 
corruption, malfeasance in office or malfeasance in judicial office.’ (Thailand NACC 2014b) 
The NACC has investigated the country’s former Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra over 
her family’s business interests and a rice subsidy government program (McKirdy et al 2017) 
for which she was subsequently sentenced to jail in absentia (Cochrane 2017). She follows in 
the footsteps of her brother, another former PM, Thaksin Shinawatra, who was the subject of 
a previous NACC investigation a decade earlier and was also jailed in absentia (Biswas et al 
2015). At the time of writing, both Shinawatra family members are still in exile and there is 
criticism of other Thai ‘elite groups [using] the mantra of “corruption”’ (Dyussenov 2017: 
337) as a vendetta against the Shinawatras, politicising the NACC in the process. 
These six case studies show the spectrum of successful and not-so-successful pursuit of 
corrupt actors. Nevertheless, these anti-corruption bodies provide an avenue for public 
assurance in their institutions despite their imperfections. Within the region, anti-corruption 
commissions are important institutions to help and improve each nation’s development by 
confronting deeply embedded political culture and associated elites.  
5 Australian political culture and Australian political institutions  
In considering Australia’s journey as it looks to establishing its own national anti-corruption 
watchdog, it is necessary to provide a context of Australian political culture and its 
institutions in order to understand the state of the country’s NIE. In particular, there is the 
overarching and long-standing concept of ‘mateship’ where - in its most dysfunctional form – 
it can border on ‘crony culture’ (Cave & Kwai 2018) facilitated by favours of rent-seeking 
and regulatory capture involving the Australian elite networks in business and political 
spheres (Murray & Frijters 2017). 
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In more recent decades of broad political consensus on market-driven reform agendas in 
Australia, corruption has become particularly manifest at the intersection of issues such as 
privatization, marketization, outsourcing, competition, lobbying, think tanks, industry bodies 
and other elements that are also to varying degrees present in other OECD countries. 
Corruption arises particularly in those sectors of the economy with significant potential for 
‘rent seeking’ by preferentially influencing government policies, subsidies, funding 
programs, regulations and outsourcing, that favour rich, established interests. These sectors 
include minerals, energy and resources; aged care and private health care; banking, finance 
and consulting; telecommunications, media and technology; infrastructure, construction and 
property development; amongst others. The range of such specific political culture issues 
addressed within this paper demonstrates the breadth of remit and powers with which an 
effective federal anti-corruption watchdog would need to operate.  
The representative voice of the community is expressed through Australian public and 
political institutions bearing on integrity and anti-corruption. The key integrity and anti-
corruption institutions that give voice to the Australian community’s values and concerns 
include the Auditor-General, Electoral Commission, Ombudsman, Royal Commissions, 
Regulators, Judiciary, the Police, and the Legislature. Concerns may also be raised through 
the Media, NGOs and Whistleblower associations. Underpinning this is the ‘rule of law’ 
through a strong presence and inheritance of English Common Law. The ethical behaviour of 
politicians and public servants is governed generally through non-statutory voluntary ‘codes 
of conduct’. The design of an anti-corruption federal body in respect to powers and scope will 
need to reflect the existing institutions’ mandates, experiences, strengths and weaknesses. 
5.1 The proposed National Integrity Commission 
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While there are state-based anti-corruption bodies, at the time of writing one does not exist at 
the federal level. In Australia’s federal system, moves towards a National Integrity 
Commission were most recently informed by an inquiry held in 2016-17. While the relevance 
of state anti-corruption bodies, once established, has not been questioned - their powers are 
under scrutiny: too powerful in the case of NSW, not powerful enough in Tasmania. Some of 
them exhibit the ongoing stresses and strains of the push (such as cases of corruption reported 
in the media and ensuing widespread public opprobrium) and pull (such as powerful elite 
networks) factors that underpin their continued existence. 
Nevertheless, their track record is evidence of their importance and critical role in ensuring 
accountability in the functioning and the transparent discharge of the duties of state 
governments, state bodies and public servants. However, the extent of their powers remain a 
contested issue – they have too much power from the point of view of those being 
scrutinised, too little from those who wish to hold power to account. In particular, their often 
secret investigatory and associated public hearing procedures see them tarred by their 
opponents as ‘kangaroo courts’.   
Federal parliamentarians, and indeed sections of Australian business, have long resisted and 
indeed denied the need for such a body at the national level (Oquist 2018) despite long-
standing public support for its establishment and continuing decline in public trust of 
politicians (Denniss 2017). Federal politicians are clearly unenthusiastic about taking the risk 
of scrutinising their own actions. In February 2018, the then former deputy Prime Minister 
Barnaby Joyce resigned from his position due to personal issues which exposed his business 
‘mates’ (Cave and Kwai 2018; McIlroy 2018), while in April 2018 the then Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull awarded a half-a-billion dollar untendered grant to the Great Barrier Reef 
Foundation whose board members represented some of the highest polluting companies and 
industries in the country (Cox 2018).  
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The Joyce Affair and Reefgate, the sobriquets given to these incidents, showed the underbelly 
of Australia’s federal political class – the intertwining of personal affairs, lobbying, 
ministerial discretion and the value of political connections at the expense of transparency 
and the public interest.  
While cases such as Joyce tend to gain the public’s attention and opprobrium over 
misbehaving taxpayer-funded public figures, it is in the actions of the less sensational, bread-
and-butter personalities in charge of Australia’s federal agencies that also support the case for 
a federal anti-corruption watchdog as a missing, crucial piece in Australia’s institutional 
integrity jigsaw.  
In 2017, the main revenue generating arms of the federal government, the Australian Tax 
Office (ATO) and Australian Customs, had incidences of corruption by senior public servants 
that underlined the ineffectiveness of existing bodies to tackle malfeasance. In May 2017, the 
ATO’s Deputy Commissioner, Michael Cranston, was forced to resign after it was uncovered 
he was connected, through a relative, to a syndicate that perpetrated a AU$165 million tax 
fraud (Olding & Levy 2017). In August 2017, an Australian Border Force officer and former 
customs officer were arrested over importation of illegal drugs (Hall 2017) amidst allegations 
of links to criminal families and transnational crime, and with this incident the systemic 
failure of an internal anti-corruption watchdog to gain hold within the agency (McKenzie & 
Baker 2017).  
It was in this climate of growing public mistrust that the inquiry into establishing a federal 
anti-corruption watchdog was set in motion. As a former Victorian Supreme Court judge 
Stephen Charles said: 
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It is already well known that there is abundant corruption in the other capital cities 
around Australia, why on earth does the air suddenly clear around Queanbeyan [near 
the capital Canberra]? (in Peacock 2017)  
In January 2018, the Federal opposition Labor leader Bill Shorten announced his support for 
establishing a Federal anti-corruption body, a month after the resignation of a Labor senator 
found to be unduly influenced by Chinese donors (Walker 2017). Chinese interference in 
Australian politics is largely based through political donations of significant sums to both 
sides of politics (Murphy 2017). The community interest lies in whether such donations 
interferes with differing foreign policies over the South China Sea (see Lester & dela Rama 
2018) and adversely influences domestic policies covering the treatment of pro-democracy 
activists in Australia.  
In support of this proposed body, Shorten (2018) stated it will be ‘modelled on the lessons of 
the state anti-corruption bodies’ with its powers wide-ranging and well-resourced analogous 
to a ‘standing Royal Commission.’ The success of the Banking Royal Commission (2018), 
which shone light on malfeasance in the financial services sector, also reinforced this need. 
Amidst political instability afflicting the sitting government, in November 2018, the 
Australian independent politician, Cathy McGowan, introduced a national integrity 
commission bill (McGowan 2018) based on consultation with a wide variety of anti-
corruption stakeholders including Transparency International Australia. Her bill proposed 
three integrity commissioners covering national integrity enforcement, law enforcement and 
whistleblower protection. In December 2018 the minority Morrison Government announced a 
Commonwealth Integrity Commission, which proposed two integrity divisions: law 
enforcement and public sector integrity (AG 2018). However, it has been roundly criticised 
as a ‘very weak’ model with no public hearings, no public findings and direct referral to the 
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prosecutor for decision whether to act or not in the public sector integrity division 
(Fitzsimons 2018) which could leave politicians and their associates unaccountable publicly.  
It is expected that Australia will have some form of national integrity commission after the 
next federal election in 2019, with the likely structure a negotiated outcome from the above 
three proposals. Central to its potential effectiveness in the ‘public interest’ will be its 
independence and transparency in conducting public hearings with public findings.  
6 Discussion: Institutions, corruption and implications for the region 
“…[I]t is not by the consolidation, or concentration of powers, but by their distribution, that 
good government is effected.” –Thomas Jefferson (1821 in Ford 1904-05) 
“…[N]o one ever seizes power with the intention of relinquishing it.” – 1984 (George 
Orwell) 
The problem of corruption is linked to the notion of integrity (Sampford 2016). Corruption is 
the misuse of public position for private gain. Integrity is the appropriate use of public power 
for public ends. The latter sets the standard and associated process while the former is a 
deviation from that standard and practice. In a democracy it is for the community to set the 
expected standards of integrity against which corruption can be determined. In a 
representative democracy, the community devolves its standard setting to its parliamentary 
representatives on the assumption that they will act in the public interest. The moral and 
ethical problem of corruption arises when the political process among politicians and 
governments expressed in legislation becomes perverted by undue private influence of vested 
interests over public policy-making and decision-making. 
The chart below places all of these issues in an Australian NIE: 
[Insert Chart 2 here] 
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While the detail in this chart can be rather complex, the ecosystem – by its nature – is 
complex, malleable and changeable. The notion of the ‘public good’ is the desired outcome, 
balanced but shaped by the forces of institutions, culture, trust and values. Broader, often 
internationally originating drivers such as globalisation, privatization, neo-liberalism and 
increasing corporatisation have been perceived as resulting greater inequality in the country. 
Homo economicus, and its dominant self-interest, is at odds with the homo reciprocans of 
public institutions. Increasing private sector power, for example, through legitimate ‘tax 
avoidance’ schemes have resulted in community concerns that they are not paying their ‘fair 
share’ of social expenses in operating in a democratically stable country (Clark 2017). While 
Australia provides a secure legal environment for property rights; the institutional costs 
(Chang 2005) in supporting such an environment is increasingly being ignored by that sector.  
The private sector has an instrumental role to play in a country that prides itself to be liberally 
democratic. It is in the best interests of the sector that businesses support the public 
institutions that balance their needs with that of the community. Where corrupt players 
participate in a sector, the private sector participants that do not engage in this are unfairly 
penalised. A strong private sector benefits from an even playing field, with government 
institutions acting and exercising their roles of impartial referees. Where these same 
institutions are captured by vested interests, then the sector and by default, the community 
loses. Public institutions are the fine line that distinguishes functional stable and equitable 
societies from dysfunctional ones.  
The proposed framework in this paper maps the field where institutions and corruption 
interplay. It can be adapted and applied to any country in the region. Identifying how the 
relevant cultural variables are embedded within a given society and where they lie in the 
integrity-corruption spectrum illuminates understanding of how institutions operate in corrupt 
environments and cultures to both thwart and counter broader corruption.  
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In Australia, political corruption is generally not perceived as a major problem disrupting the 
entire government polity as it does in other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. However, its 
standing in global corruption indices has decreased notably over the past six years, to stand at 
13th least corrupt country in 2018 shadowing an embedded and growing problem in this area: 
The misuse of travel allowances, inadequate regulation of foreign political donations, 
conflicts of interest in planning approvals, revolving doors and a culture of mateship, 
inappropriate industry lobbying in large-scale projects such as mining, and the misuse of 
power by leading politicians have no doubt had an impact. (Ryan 2018) 
 
There is a also a decline in public trust including a good deal of concern about how fairly 
people are treated by public officials and about the lack of government responsiveness and 
sense of powerlessness in their access to, and influence in, the political process (Bean 2012). 
Public perceptions of the probity with which politicians act are useful indicators of political 
integrity and thereby sustaining the trust of citizens in their politicians. These public 
perceptions of probity are ‘coherent, substantively meaningful, responsive and most 
importantly, they do matter’ (Rose 2014). Probity is seen to be about ‘playing by the rules’ or 
in the ‘spirit of the public service’. It is less about formal, prescriptive rules, and more by way 
of an appropriate exercise of public office. The process of governing is emphasized over the 
outcomes produced by government.  
Machiavelli posed a rift between a morally admirable and a virtuous political life. An ethical 
challenge lies in the art of compromise without losing integrity but this poses a basic political 
dilemma: democratic politics is accepted as the art of political compromise, ‘the art of the 
possible’, yet as a society we appear to be allergic to it when it happens. Can such moralistic 
assumptions legitimately justify the contemporary vilification and loss of trust in politicians? 
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‘A compromising disposition’ is an ambiguous virtue, politically expedient but not 
necessarily morally admirable; and while uncongenial to moral integrity it is an essential 
aspect of political integrity (Tillyris 2017).  To argue that political integrity should be akin to 
moral integrity idealises the notion of political integrity and the day-to-day, practical and 
messy context within which democratic politicians operate.  This real world context is 
characterized by a plurality of incompatible traditions, each with its own values and 
principles.   
In this view, what matters for integrity is how decisions are made and how policies are 
implemented (Rothstein 2011). This suggests that a dictatorship producing outcomes desired 
by voters would be regarded as having less political legitimacy and perceptions of 
trustworthiness than those produced by a democratic system of government. This conclusion 
is bolstered by the evidence that despite decreasingly low levels of trust in the political 
system, most citizens (Norris 2011) still consider democracy the best form of government. 
But it must be recognized that this is a fragile consensus currently under real threat from the 
rise of authoritarian, nationalistic politics and politicians. 
Issues of policy access and influence in return for political donations and post-public office 
employment as lobbyists or consultants, as well as the influence of privately funded policy 
think tanks and corporate lobbyists, are growing in importance and particularly hard to 
grapple with for transparency, accountability and integrity. As former Senator Faulkner 
(2012) pointed out:  
The perception of undue influence can be as damaging to democracy as undue 
influence itself. It undermines confidence in our processes of government, making it 
difficult to untangle the motivation behind policy decisions. 
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The ‘fluid dynamics’ of political culture means that it can paradoxically both inhibit political 
change and be a source of it (Welch 2013). Paradoxically too, it can serve policy-makers well 
despite its poor scientific standing. It may not explain social conduct, but it can be used to 
devise intelligent questions about the likely consequences of political actions. The notion of 
political culture poses an apparent contradiction in both the fluidity and the inertia of political 
life: between the unacceptable extremes of complete environmental or complete cultural 
determinism. The central liberal truth is ‘that politics can change culture and save it from 
itself’.  The problem is one of explanatory circularity: to effect cultural change it needs 
already to have happened. Culture enters as an explanation for both the success and the 
failure of programs of cultural change. 
In establishing a NIE, a wider anti-corruption institutional infrastructure needs to be 
recognised and further developed. According to Pope (2000), an NIE involves a number of 
‘pillars’ The ‘pillars’ (Greek temples) include the legislature, executive, judiciary, auditor 
general, ombudsman, watchdog agencies, public service, media, civil society, private sector 
and international actors. While these institutional pillars may vary across the region, the 
common thread unifying these are that these players are underpinned by cross-cutting public 
awareness and society’s values. 
The NIE can be likened to a ‘bird’s nest’, built up over time from material to hand, with 
components individually weak but in combination effective. These individual elements 
dynamically and constantly interacting with each other, pulling first one way then the other, 
constantly re-configuring the balance of interests, private and public. This is the essential 
complex dynamic of a systemic failure in politics and government. While some elites would 
wish to have less accountability and engage in rent-seeking; short-term myopic self-interest 
has a long-term debilitating effect.  This is the test that confronts the institutional quandary of 
establishing a federal ICAC in Australia, and as earlier mentioned in this paper, is akin to 
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issues confronting other countries in the region. Striking an appropriate balance between 
public interest, private gain and community good is necessarily the ongoing result of a 
negotiated outcome reflected in the operationalization of anti-corruption commissions around 
the region. Further research, such as ethnographic approaches, may enhance this framework 
so as to increase its relevance and its adoptability in other countries of the region. It would 
provide further insights for those countries into the nature of the inevitable complex systemic 
struggle to establish an effective ant-corruption institution. It might also act as a framework 
against which those countries that have already put in place their anti-corruption commissions 
– as a national institution – might review their ongoing effectiveness and viability. The NIE 
model is but a start in defining the boundaries of the field of corrupt practices on an 
institutional level and the values that underpin such activities. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper started by considering the different experiences of anti-corruption commissions 
around the Asia Pacific region set against the current debate in Australia of establishing a 
national anti-corruption commission. It proposes a framework that we term ‘national integrity 
ecosystem’ to provide a greater understanding of where and how a national integrity system 
can be placed in its attempt to address corruption and promote anti-corrupt practices 
effectively and systemically. It also sought to compare the experience of corruption and its 
effects with anti-corruption commissions of the Asia-Pacific region. We use these cases to 
discuss Australia’s attempts to date to create a national body to deal with federal level 
corruption issues. This paper shows that while there are international frameworks, 
agreements and principles in place in the region and globally to deal with corrupt behaviour 
and promote anti-corrupt practices, the local cultural and institutional context of a country is 
paramount. Anti-corrupt practices must adapt and address the local issues and political 
culture efficiently and effectively in order to prevent further political behaviour that is 
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corrosive of public trust. This is critical to rebuilding trust in our political institutions as 
reflecting community values and the NIE framework provides an insight into the possible 
management of corruption across the Asia-Pacific.  
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Table 1: List of Six Anti-Corruption Bodies in Five Asia-Pacific Countries 
Country Name Year 
Established 









1978  Communist Party 
members 
Business interests of 
Communist Party 
members and guanxi 
network; international 
reach for Party 
members with overseas 







1974 Public officials 
including police, and 
private sector 
Operations department 
divided into two: public 
and private. Private 
                                                          
5 China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) Home Page (in Mandarin), 




sector has its own 










2002 Police, electoral 
officials, regulatory 
officials, politicians 
Politicians who are also 
businessmen and using 






2009 Public sector officials 
and civil complaints. 
Motto is “For the 
people; against the 
corrupt.”  
Corrupt transactions 
such as bribes between 
receivers (nominally 
public sector officials) 










2001 Public sector officials 
and civil complaints 
Limited to “breaking 
the chain of corruption 






2008 Investigate public 
sector officials and 
“supervise and 
observe the ethics of 
persons holding 
political positions.”11 
Business interests of 
public officials. 
 
Figure 1: Private Sector Investigation Unit of HK’s ICAC12 
                                                          
6 HK Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), A Brief History, 
http://www.icac.org.hk/en/about/history/index.html accessed 2nd February 2018 
7 HK ICAC, Organization Structure http://www.icac.org.hk/en/ops/struct/index.html accessed 2nd 
February 2018  
8 Indonesia’s Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) Home Page (in Bahasa Indonesia), 
https://www.kpk.go.id/id accessed 2nd February 2018 
9 South Korea’s Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC), Home Page, 
http://www.acrc.go.kr/en/  accessed 2nd February 2018  
10 Thailand’s Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), Home Page, 
https://www.nacc.go.th/main.php?filename=index_en accessed 2nd February 2018 
11 Thailand’s NACC, Duties and Responsibilities, https://www.nacc.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=937 
accessed 2nd February 2018 






Table 2: History of South Korea’s anti-corruption institutions13 
Year Name Remarks 
July 2001 Anti-Corruption Commission Establishment 
July 2005 





Integrated to “Anti-corruption and Civil 
Rights Commission”  
Amalgamation of the Ombudsman 
of Korea + Korea Independent 
Commission Against Corruption + 
The Administrative Appeals 
Commission 
 
                                                          
13 We would like to thank our reviewer for explaining this institutional evolution. 
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